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Reet ae
Facsimile of Attorney's
Signature On Mass
Mailing Violates the Fair
Debt Collection Practices
Act
In Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d
1314 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that a
mass-produced collection letter bear-
ing a facsimile of an attorney's signa-
ture constituted a false and misleading
communication in violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. Section 1692-
1692p (1993), where the attorney failed
to personally review the debtor's file or
correspondence prior to sending the
letter. The Second Circuit awarded the
maximum statutory damages to the com-
plaining debtor for the violation.
The Threatening Letters
NCB Collection Services (NCB)
collected debts on behalf of American
Family Publishers (Publishers), an or-
ganization that sells magazine subscrip-
tions. In an attempt to collect on Pub-
lishers' delinquent accounts, NCB's
part-time general counsel, Philip D.
Jackson, authorized the issuance of
collection letters which NCB sent to
approximately one million debtors each
year through a computerized mass-mail-
ing. If the debtor failed to respond to
the initial mailing, the computer gener-
ated additional letters on a predeter-
mined schedule. Furthermore, no em-
ployee of NCB reviewed individual
debtor files until the debtor responded
to the agency's demand for payment.
During a two-month period in late
1990 and early 1991, Christ Clomon
received six collection letters from NCB
regarding a $9.42 debt she owed to
Publishers. The first letter Clomon
received contained NCB's logo and the
name of an NCB account supervisor.
The subsequent letters, however, were
sent on Jackson's letterhead which iden-
tified him as an attorney, and bore a
facsimile of his signature, using the
title "General Counsel, NCB Collec-
tion Services." Each letter also con-
tained a variety of threatening state-
ments such as "[aIcting as General
Counsel for NCB Collection Services,
I have told them that they can lawfully
undertake collection activity to collect
your debt... "and "[b]ecause of your
failure to make any effort to pay your
lawful debt.., we may find it necessary
to recommend to your creditor that ap-
propriate action be taken to satisfy your
debt."
In response to the collection letters,
Clomon filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. She alleged that Jackson
had violated the FDCPA by authoriz-
ing NCB to issue the collection letters
she had received. Specifically, Clomon
contended that the letters contained false
and misleading information in viola-
tion of FDCPA Section 1692e.
After denying Jackson's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the district
court granted Clomon's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court held that
Jackson had violated FDCPA Section
1692e(3) which prohibited "the false
representation or implication that any
individual is an attorney or that any
communication is from an attorney."
According to the district court, the let-
ters Jackson approved falsely implied
that he had been retained by NCB for
the purpose of collecting a particular
person's debt. Despite the absence of
any actual damages, the district court
also granted Clomon's motion for
$1,000 in "additional damages" under
FDCPA Section 1692k. Jackson ap-
pealed the district court's ruling, con-
tending that: (1) the court erred in find-
ing that the letters violated FDCPA
Section 1692e(3), and (2) the court's
award of "additional damages" was an
abuse of its discretion.
The "Least Sophisticated Consumer"
Standard
Under FDCPA Section 1692e, Con-
gress established a general prohibition
against the use of "false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any
debt." Furthermore, Congress identi-
fied sixteen specific practices which
fall under Section 1692e's ban. How-
ever, as evidence of the statute's broad
scope, a debt collection practice can
fail to fall within any of the sixteen
subsections of Section 1692e and still
be a violation of the statute.
In determining whether an actual
collection practice violates the statute,
the courts have typically employed the
"least sophisticated consumer" stan-
dard, which purports to ensure that the
FDCPA protects all consumers regard-
less of their level of sophistication.
Under the standard, the courts have
evaluated the deceptiveness of a collec-
tion practice from the standpoint of
consumers with "below-average sophis-
tication or intelligence [because they]
are especially vulnerable to fraudulent
schemes." Although originally rooted
in the consumer protection laws tradi-
tionally used by the courts, the "least
sophisticated consumer" standard took
its modem form through the courts' use
of the Federal Trade Commission Act
in interpreting the FDCPA. Subse-
quently, the courts have employed the
standard to protect consumers in a vari-
ety of ways. Using this standard, courts
have found that collection notices con-
taining language that "overshadows"
or "contradicts" other language inform-
ing consumers of their rights to be in
violation of the FDCPA. Additionally,
the courts have used the "least sophis-
ticated consumer" standard to hold col-
lection notices misleading where they
use formats or typefaces which tend to
obscure important information con-
tained in the notice. Finally, the courts
have also interpreted the standard to
find that collection notices are decep-
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tive if they are open to more than one
reasonable interpretation, one of which
is inaccurate.
In formulating and applying the stan-
dard, the courts have been careful to
preserve the concept of reasonableness
in the debtor's interpretation of a col-
lection notice. By rejecting unreason-
able interpretations, the courts have
ensured that the "least sophisticated
consumer" standard meets its dual pur-
poses of ensuring the protection of all
consumers, while also protecting debt
collectors from unwarranted liabilities.
Jackson Challenges the Inaccuracies
of the Collection Letters
In challenging the district court's
finding that the collection letters vio-
lated FDCPA Section 1692e(3), Jack-
son initially argued that the letters'
"overstatement" of the degree of his
involvement in the collection process
did not violate the subsection or any
other provision of the statute because
he was an attorney and the letters were
actually from him. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected this argument by
recognizing the broad scope of Section
1692e and noting the possibility of up-
holding the lower court's decision even
if the facts of the case failed to establish
a violation of a specific subsection of
the statute. Consequently, the court
found that the district court properly
concluded that the collection notices
specifically violated Section 1692e(3),
as well as Section 1692e(10).
Initially, the court found that NCB's
use of Jackson's letterhead and fac-
simile signature on the letters was suf-
ficient to convince the "least sophisti-
cated consumer" that she was in direct
contact with an attorney, when actually
she was not. Accordingly, the court
found the letters to be false and mis-
leading in violation of Section 1692e(3).
Furthermore, the court found the
"least sophisticated consumer" would
believe that Jackson was personally
involved in her case because of the
letter's language. Because Jackson was
not involved in the daily operations of
the debt collection process, the court
held that he had violated Section
1692e(10) which prohibited "the use of
any false representation or deceptive
means to collect" a debt from a con-
sumer.
Finally, despite recognizing the need
for mass mailings in the debt collection
industry, the Second Circuit reiterated
the necessity for mass mailings to con-
form to FDCPA mandates. The court
noted that most mass mailings contain-
ing facsimiles of an attorney's signa-
ture would violate Section 1692e if the
attorney was not directly involved in
the collection of an individual's debt.
Unintentional Acts, Good Faith, and
the Award of "Additional Damages"
Jackson also objected to the lower
court's award of $1,000 of "additional
damages" to Clomon by arguing that
the award was an abuse of the district
court's discretion. In support of his
challenge, Jackson argued that his non-
compliance with Section 1692e was
unintentional and in "good faith."
Moreover, Jackson contended that he
approved of the collection letters in
reliance upon the "authoritative inter-
pretations" of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the district court's
decision in Howe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). However, the Second Circuit
found Jackson's arguments
unpersuasive.
Initially, the court rejected Jackson's
"good faith" argument by pointing to
the language of FDCPA Section 1692e
which clearly banned the type of letter
that Jackson had authorized for NCB's
use. The court also found that the
FTC's receipt of the letters without
disapproving of their content was not
evidence of the FTC's authoritative in-
terpretation and approval of the letters.
Despite acknowledging that Publishers
sent copies of Jackson's letters to the
FTC as part of an unrelated investiga-
tion of Publisher's compliance with the
FDCPA, the court placed weight on
Jackson's admission during a deposi-
tion that the FTC routinely received
copies of collection letters without
evaluating the lawfulness of those let-
ters. Consequently, the court admon-
ished Jackson for his claimed igno-
rance of the well-established practices
of the FTC.
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected
Jackson's interpretation of Howe. Al-
though the Second Circuit recognized
the Howe court's holding that a debt
collector could rely on creditor's records
in determining whether to send collec-
tion letters, the court found that nothing
in the Howe decision released an attor-
ney from making a determination about
a debtor's account prior to sending a
collection letter bearing the attorney's
signature. The Second Circuit con-
cluded that Howe did not release any
debt collector from the requirements of
FDCPA Section 1692e. *
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Consumer Demand and
Product Utility Weigh In
Product Liability Action
Based On Defective
Product Theory
In Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,
997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that in order for a plaintiff
to recover punitive damages, he must
show that a defendant's conduct was
outrageous or indifferent to consumer
safety. The court also found that in a
strict liability case, the jury should make
the ultimate determination as to whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous.
Furthermore, a defendant is entitled to
a jury instruction on the defense of
contributory fault if the defendant shows
that the plaintiff had general knowl-
edge that the product presented a risk of
causing the injury in question. Finally,
the court concluded that to admit evi-
dence of other accidents at trial, the
facts and circumstances of the other
accidents must be substantially similar
to the current case facts.
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